{"id":3521,"date":"2026-01-19T10:19:51","date_gmt":"2026-01-19T09:19:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/flex.uni-frankfurt.de\/?p=3521"},"modified":"2026-01-19T10:20:18","modified_gmt":"2026-01-19T09:20:18","slug":"incentives-self-selection-and-coordination-of-motivated-agents-for-the-production-of-social-goods","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/flex.uni-frankfurt.de\/index.php\/publications\/incentives-self-selection-and-coordination-of-motivated-agents-for-the-production-of-social-goods\/","title":{"rendered":"Incentives, self-selection, and coordination of motivated agents for the production of social goods"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"custom-pagination-text-research-img\"><a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/j.geb.2025.04.010\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone wp-image-3089\" src=\"https:\/\/flex.uni-frankfurt.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/01\/X08998256.jpg\"\" width=\"193\" height=\"261\" \/><\/a><\/div>\n<div class=\"custom-pagination-text-research-content\">Kevin Bauer, Michael Kosfeld &#038; Ferdinand A. von Siemens,\u00a02025, <em>Games and Economic Behavior, <\/em>152, 276-292<em><br \/>\n<\/em><\/p>\n<div><\/div>\n<div class=\"custom-pagination-text-research-content\">\n<p><!--more Continue reading--><\/p>\n<div class=\"custom-pagination-text-research-content\"><a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/j.geb.2025.04.010\">link to publication<\/a><\/div>\n<div class=\"custom-pagination-text-research-abstract\">Abstract:<br \/>\nWe study, theoretically and empirically, the effect of incentives on the self-selection and coordination of motivated agents to produce \u201csocial\u201d goods in the presence of positive effort complementarities. Theory predicts that lowering incentives increases social-good production via the self-selection and coordination of motivated agents into low-incentive work environments. We test this prediction in a novel lab experiment that allows us to isolate the effect of self-selection cleanly. Results show that social-good production more than doubles if incentives are low, but only if self-selection is possible. The analysis identifies a crucial role of incentives in the matching and coordination of motivated agents.\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[16],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3521","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-publications"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/flex.uni-frankfurt.de\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3521","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/flex.uni-frankfurt.de\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/flex.uni-frankfurt.de\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/flex.uni-frankfurt.de\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/flex.uni-frankfurt.de\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3521"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/flex.uni-frankfurt.de\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3521\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3525,"href":"https:\/\/flex.uni-frankfurt.de\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3521\/revisions\/3525"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/flex.uni-frankfurt.de\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3521"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/flex.uni-frankfurt.de\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3521"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/flex.uni-frankfurt.de\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3521"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}